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I. Introduction 
While not the most visible of taxes, the state insurance premium tax is levied 
on insurance companies by every state, generally as a substitute for the state 
corporate income tax being imposed on insurers.  For the U.S. in 2006, $15.4 billion 
in taxes on insurance premiums were collected on $1.26 trillion worth of insurance 
premiums and annuity considerations, accounting for approximately 2.4 percent of 
state tax revenue.  In Georgia, the insurance premium tax generated $341.7 million in 
revenue in FY 2007, which was 1.92 percent of total state tax revenue. 
Table 1 contains a list of the number of insurance companies by product line 
domiciled in each state in 2006.  There is a wide variation among the states.  Larger 
states in terms of population tend to have more domestic companies, but there are 
exceptions.  For example, Vermont has some almost 500 “other” companies, which 
are so-called captive companies owned by non-insurer parents.  Arizona has a large 
number of life and health companies.  Texas has some 151 property-liability 
companies, many of which write insurance in a relatively small area and are the result 
of historical regulatory policy.   
The average state in 2004 had about 40 domestic companies and an additional 
597 foreign companies operating in the state.  The average state also had about 2 
percent of the national property casualty employment and about $2.4 million in 
premiums per 1,000 people.  The average domestic property-casualty market share 
was just under 20 percent. 
The premium tax rates in the U.S. range around 2.5 percent, but because the 
tax is on gross premiums rather than profits, its effects may be quite substantial.  For 
example, Neubig, Jaggi, and Messina (2002) estimate that the premium tax is almost 
double the tax that an insurance firm would pay if it were subject to the state 
corporate income tax. 
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TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES BY STATE, 2005 
State Life/ Health Property/ Casualty Health Only* Other** Total % of US Total 
Alabama 13 22 5 4 44 0.57 
Alaska 0 7 2 2 11 0.14 
Arizona 220 46 19 66 351 4.58 
Arkansas 35 11 8 16 70 0.91 
California 27 125 NA 34 186 2.43 
Colorado 10 18 21 16 65 0.85 
Connecticut 32 69 6 2 109 1.42 
Delaware 37 79 10 7 133 1.73 
D.C. 3 7 7 65 82 1.07 
Florida 40 124 72 317 553 7.21 
Georgia 15 39 14 60 128 1.67 
Hawaii 3 17 5 158 183 2.39 
Idaho 3 9 6 1 19 0.25 
lIIinois 70 197 25 98 390 5.09 
Indiana 44 69 18 54 185 2.41 
Iowa 23 54 9 115 201 2.62 
Kansas 14 26 7 3 50 0.65 
Kentucky 9 7 12 24 52 0.68 
Louisiana 51 33 11 37 132 1.72 
Maine 2 21 4 0 27 0.35 
Maryland 8 46 24 1 79 1.03 
Massachusetts 19 54 14 5 92 1.20 
Michigan 25 67 46 9 147 1.92 
Minnesota 12 50 16 99 177 2.31 
Mississippi 23 17 3 7 50 0.65 
Missouri 34 53 27 115 229 2.99 
Montana 2 4 4 26 36 0.47 
Nebraska 28 35 4 34 101 1.32 
Nevada 2 14 14 66 96 1.25 
New Hampshire 3 29 8 1 41 0.53 
New Jersey 6 86 4 17 113 1.47 
New Mexico 3 9 9 0 21 0.27 
New York 85 194 57 223 559 7.29 
North Carolina 5 66 14 2 87 1.13 
North Dakota 3 17 5 15 40 0.52 
Ohio 37 135 28 63 263 3.43 
Oklahoma 28 50 11 7 96 1.25 
Table 1 continues next page…
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TABLE 1 (CONT). DISTRIBUTION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES BY STATE, 2005 
State Life/ Health Property/ Casualty Health Only* Other** Total % of US Total 
Oregon 3 15 22 108 148 1.93 
Pennsylvania 37 193 41 30 301 3.93 
Rhode Island 4 24 4 0 32 0.42 
South Carolina 14 34 9 123 180 2.35 
South Dakota 1 18 6 19 44 0.57 
Tennessee 14 20 11 22 67 0.87 
Texas 157 237 52 31 477 6.22 
Utah 15 10 12 16 53 0.69 
Vermont 2 15 4 546 567 7.40 
Virginia 14 18 19 25 76 0.99 
Washington 10 21 21 4 56 0.73 
West Virginia 2 5 5 11 23 0.30 
Wisconsin 35 182 37 126 380 4.96 
Wyoming 0 2 2 1 5 0.07 
United States*** 1299 2725 811 2831 7666 
*Blue Cross/Blue Shield, HMOs and hospital, medical and dental indemnity (HMDI) plans that provide stipulated 
payments to an insured person during hospital confinement for virtually all costs related to hospital stays; other 
medical expenses; and for dental services and supplies. 
**Includes Fraternal, Title, Risk Retention Group, and Other lines. 
***Includes territories and possessions. 
Source: Insurance Information Institute, 2006 Insurance Fact Book, http://www.iii.org/financial2/insurance/allsectors/ 
and NAIC Annual Statement for 2006. 
 
Georgia has one of the higher insurance premium tax rates, and over time 
there have been calls for reducing that rate.1  One consideration is what effect would 
reducing the tax rate have on employment within the state.  However, the literature 
that addresses whether such a strategy would be successful is thin.  This report 
provides estimates of the effect of the insurance premium taxes on state-level 
employment in the insurance industry.  To estimate the effect we calculated for each 
state for each year for the period 1992-2004 the effective tax rate on premiums 
written by domestic insurers and on premiums written by foreign insurers (see below 
for  a discussion of domestic tax rate and foreign tax rate).  Using regression analysis,  
 
                                                          
1 For a discussion of Georgia’s insurance premium tax, see Grace (1998). 
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we related differences in insurance premium tax rates across states and over time to 
employment levels.   
To anticipate the results, we find that the effective insurance premium tax rate 
on property-casualty insurance companies has a negative effect on state-level 
employment in the insurance industry.  The coefficients on both tax rate variables are 
negative and statistically significant.  Furthermore, the coefficient on the foreign tax 
rate is larger than the coefficient on the domestic tax rate, as expected. The elasticity 
between per capita employment in the insurance industry and the domestic tax rate is 
-0.046, and is –0.092 with respect to the foreign tax rate.  These results imply that a 
10 percent reduction in the tax rate (2.22 to 2.42 percent) translates into 
approximately 39 additional jobs for a change in the domestic rate and 78 additional 
jobs for a change in the foreign company rate for the average state.  For Georgia, the 
results imply that a one percentage point reduction in the domestic premium tax rate 
would generate 334 new jobs, while an equal reduction in the foreign premium tax 
rate would generate 525 new jobs.  
The remainder of the report proceeds as follows.  In the next section the 
insurance premium tax is described and the relevant literature discussed.  Section 3 
presents a simple discussion of the location incentives created by the insurance 
premium tax, while Section 4 discusses insurance premium tax rates.  Section 5 
contains a simple analysis of the relationship between tax rates and employment, 
while Section 6 presents the multiple regression analysis.  Concluding comments 
finish the report. 
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II. Taxes on Insurance Premiums 
 
The regulation and taxation of the insurance industry has been left almost 
entirely to the states.  A post-Civil War Supreme Court decision asserted the fact that 
insurance was subject solely to state regulation and that the Congressional commerce 
power did not apply to the regulation and taxation of the industry.2  That changed in 
1944, when the Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Southeastern Underwriters, held that the 
insurance industry was subject to the Constitutional commerce clause provisions, and 
specifically, the antitrust laws.  Congress reacted almost immediately to overturn 
Southeastern Underwriters by passing the McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945, which 
returned to the states the sole power over regulation and taxation of insurance.   
Because states had free reign to tax the insurance industry, a number of 
anomalies developed.  First, as states were not subject to commerce clause 
restrictions on taxation, they could, and did, discriminate against out-of-state 
commerce by imposing a higher tax rate on out-of-state carriers.3  Second and almost 
uniformly, states adopted defenses to these discriminatory taxes in the form of a so-
called retaliatory tax.4  That is, if state A would tax state B’s companies at a higher 
rate than its own companies, State B would tax State A’s companies at the higher of 
the two states' tax rates.   
Retaliatory taxes are discriminatory taxes imposed on insurance providers 
chartered in states with higher premium tax rates than in the state from which it 
collects premiums.  All states except Hawaii impose retaliatory taxes.5  In practice, 
the retaliatory tax operates to tax away any advantage an out-of-state company may 
have  because of lower taxes imposed in the state in which the company is domiciled.   
                                                          
2Paul v. Virginia 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). 
3 The commerce power generally restricts states from taxing out-of-state companies at 
differentially higher rates.  See Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
4 The Supreme Court upheld the use of retaliatory taxation by the states in Western & Southern 
Life Insurance Company v. State Board of Equalization  (451 U.S. 648 (1981) based on the notion 
that Congress gave power to the states to tax and removed commerce power restrictions. 
5 Hawaii has the highest insurance premium tax rate in the nation so it has no need for a retaliatory 
tax.   
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A company thus pays the higher of the premium tax in the state in which the 
insurance policy is written and the state in which the company is domiciled.  For 
instance, if a Tennessee company, which faces a domestic premium tax rate of 2.50 
percent, writes a policy in Georgia, which has a total premium tax of 4.75 percent, 
then the company faces a premium tax of 4.75 percent on the policies written in 
Georgia.6  On the other hand, if a Georgia company writes a policy in Tennessee, 
then the Georgia company faces the 2.50 percent Tennessee tax rate plus a retaliatory 
tax of 2.25 percent, i.e., the difference between the Tennessee tax rate of 2.50 percent 
and the Georgia tax rate of 4.75 percent, for a combined tax of 4.75 percent.  Thus, 
the retaliatory tax operates so that the lowest tax rate an insurer will face nationally is 
the rate in their home state.  This provides an incentive for insurance companies to 
locate in states with a low tax rate. 
The retaliatory tax was challenged in Western and Southern Life Insurance 
Company v. State Board of Equalization.7  It is commonly believed the retaliatory tax 
is necessary to keep states from engaging in extreme domestic preferences that result 
in taxing other states’ companies at high rates. In Western and Southern, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the retaliatory tax based on the congressional 
delegation of authority to the states in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  Because 
Congress specifically exempted insurance from the commerce clause’s restrictions, 
the Court allowed the states to tax in any way they deemed necessary.8 
In general, insurance companies are not subject to the state corporate income 
tax, but are taxed on the value of premiums written in a state.  All companies writing 
policies in a state are subject to the premium tax, which is levied as a fixed 
percentage of the value of the premiums written in the state less a deduction for any 
                                                          
6 Georgia has a state premium tax rate of 2.25 percent and a local premium tax rate of 2.5 percent, 
for a total of 4.75 percent. 
7451 U.S. 648 (1981). 
8The Court did have trouble with the Equal Protection Clause argument, and this was the genesis 
for the Court’s decision in Metropolitan v. Ward (470 U.S. 869 (1985)) invalidating the broad 
protection a state had in setting domestic preferential tax rates. 
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premiums returned or dividends paid to the policyholder.9  Many states apply 
different  rates  to  the  various  lines  of insurance, such as property and casualty, life, 
health, reinsurance, self-insurance, and other, nontraditional lines.  In addition, some 
states lower the rates under certain conditions.  For example, in Georgia if the insurer 
invests a quarter of its assets in certain qualified investments, the state tax rate is 
lowered from 2.25 to 1.25 percent.  If the invested amount is equal to 75 percent of 
total assets, then the tax rate is further lowered to 0.005 percent.   
Neubig and Vlaisavljevich (1992) provide a thorough review of the non-
federal taxes facing insurance companies.  These include premium taxes and income 
or franchise taxes, but also may include state and local property taxes.  In all states, 
the premium tax paid is credited against the corporate income tax so that the firm 
only pays the greater of the two liabilities, which is always the premium tax.  Many 
states offer special domestic company tax credits or preferences, such as tax credits 
for investments and employment and retaliatory taxes paid to other states.  Finally, 
states may require companies to pay into a guaranty fund designed to cover the 
claims of insolvent insurance companies.  While some states offer a credit against the 
premium tax for amounts paid into the fund, not all do, nor do all the others provide a 
100 percent credit (NAIC, 2006).   
 There has been little written on the effects of taxes as they relate specifically 
to the insurance industry, and none of the papers consider the effect on employment.  
The paper closest to the current paper is by Wheaton (1986), who considers the 
impact of state taxes on life insurance company asset growth rates.  Using company 
level data on the 77 largest life insurance companies in the country, the author 
constructs an effective tax rate consisting of the combined effect of domestic and 
foreign premium taxes, and other aspects of state tax law to determine the effective 
state  tax  rate for a typical firm for several states.  Company growth in assets over the  
                                                          
9 While almost every state has the premium tax, some have both a premium tax and an income tax.  
However, because the premium tax is always greater than then income tax (and the income tax is 
creditable against the premium tax), in this paper we refer to the premium tax as the method of 
taxing the insurance industry. 
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1966-1981 period is regressed against this effective tax rate as well as other factors 
believed to be determinants of company growth.  The econometric analysis reveals a 
consistently negative and significant coefficient associated with the effective state tax 
rate.  While the results indicate a fairly small effect, a $10 million increase in tax 
liability decreases company growth by 0.9 percent, the effect is statistically 
significant.  While illustrative of the effect of premium taxes on insurers’ growth 
prospects, Wheaton does not consider the effect of taxes on the location of 
headquarters or employment.    
 There are other documented effects of the premium tax. Petroni and 
Shackelford (1995), for example, consider the effect of both state taxes and regulation 
on the choice of organizational form of property and casualty insurers.  The results 
indicate that states with higher insurance premium tax rates and regulatory burdens 
have significantly lower numbers of domesticated insurance companies or a lower 
percentage of insurance premiums sold by domestic insurers.  In addition, Ke, et al. 
(2000) find that increases in taxes on premiums of non-automobile lines of insurance 
increase self-insurance in a state.     
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III. Incentives of State Premium Taxes and Location of 
Insurance Industry Employment 
 
 We start with a simple example to illustrate the incentive that the insurance 
premium tax has on insurance companies.  The premium tax is a form of gross 
receipts tax paid on a destination basis.  If this was the end of the story, the premium 
taxes would not affect where the firm located.  However, the presence of the 
retaliatory taxes changes the incentive.  For example, consider the hypothetical 
example presented in Table 2.  Assume that a firm is considering locating in one of 
three states, denoted Low, Medium, and High to reflect the relative magnitude of 
their premium tax rate.  Let t represent the state premium tax rate and P represent the 
value of total premiums written in a state.   
 
TABLE 2.  ILLUSTRATION OF PREMIUM TAX 
 Premium Tax Rate Premium Tax Paid 
State Low 1% (tL*PL) + (tM*PM) + (tH*PH) = TL 
State Medium 3% (tM*PL) + (tM*PM) + (tH*PH) = TM 
State High 5% (tH*PL) + (tH*PM) + (tH*PH) = TH 
 
Regardless of where the firm writes policies, the firm’s total premium taxes 
are lowest if it locates in the state with the lowest tax rate, a result due to the 
retaliatory tax.    Therefore, this firm has an incentive to locate in the low-tax state so 
as to lower its tax liability nationwide.   
 If the firm does not write policies in the low-tax state, then the firm is 
indifferent between locating in the low-tax and the medium-tax state, but would still 
prefer either to locating in the high tax state.  On the other hand, once located in the 
low-tax state, the firm has an advantage over foreign insurers writing policies in the 
low-tax state.10  That is because the domestic firm would be subject to the low 
domestic  rate and the foreign insurers would be subject to the higher retaliatory rates.   
                                                          
10 This assumes, of course, the insurer is operating in more than one state. 
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The advantage depends on the difference between the domestic rate and the rate paid 
by foreign firms. 
 The situation is actually a bit more complicated than in the above example in 
that states can charge different tax rates for premiums written by domestic and 
foreign firms.  Where there are differences, generally it is the case that the tax rate on 
foreign firms is greater than the tax rate on domestic firms, although some states, for 
example Utah, charge a higher tax rate on domestic firms.   
 The retaliatory tax is actually based on the tax the state imposes on foreign 
firms.  Given the retaliatory nature of insurance taxation, a foreign firm pays the 
higher of the domestic tax rate and foreign tax rate in the state in which the premium 
is written, as shown in the example below.  Thus, a firm domiciled in state A is 
charged the domestic tax rate on all premiums written in that state.  However, for 
premiums written in state B, that firm pays the foreign tax rate in state B plus a 
retaliatory tax equal to the foreign tax rate in state A less the foreign rate in state B.   
For example, assume Firm 1 is domiciled in State A and Firm 2 is domiciled 
in State B and that State A’s premium tax on foreign insurance companies is greater 
than State B’s tax on foreign insurance companies, i.e. tFA> tFB.  If Firm 1 sells 
premiums in both states, then its tax liability is computed as follows: 
1 1 1 1 1[ ( )
A A B A B B A A A B
D F F F D FT t P t t t P t P t P= + + − = +  
Where P1 is the value of premiums sold by Firm 1 in State A or B and ADt  represents 
the insurance premium tax on domestic companies in State A.  From this example, it 
is clear that the domesticated state’s foreign rate is a matter of interest to its own 
domestic companies.  This is because when the domestic company sells policies in 
another state, its state’s foreign tax rate is the minimum premium tax it will face in 
another state.  From the example above, Firm 1 could lower its overall tax liability if 
its domesticated state foreign tax rate, AFt  , were lower. 
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IV. Insurance Premium Tax Rates 
 
Our focus is on the property-casualty (PC) industry, in part because it is 
possible to obtain information about the taxes paid by each insurer writing insurance 
in a state for this industry.11  We constructed state-specific effective tax rates by 
dividing total direct taxes paid to state j by insurance companies domiciled in state j 
by premiums written in state j by insurance companies domiciled in state j.  Total 
taxes include the premium tax less any credits.  Thus, our tax variable reflects state-
specific institutional provision of the premium tax.   
We constructed state-specific effective domestic and foreign tax rates.   The 
data come from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Annual 
Statement, State Page.  This dataset contains a state-by-state enumeration of 
premiums, losses, expenses, commissions, and taxes for each company writing 
business in a state in a given year.  Specifically, the data contain the amount paid in a 
given year for premium taxes, licenses, and fees, as well as any credits received.  
Total net taxes are the sum of premium taxes, licenses, and fees less any credits.  
Thus, our tax variable reflects state-specific institutional provision of the premium 
tax.  The effective domestic tax rates are calculated by dividing total direct net taxes 
paid to state s by property-casualty insurance companies domiciled in state s by 
premiums written in state s by insurance companies domiciled in state s.  The foreign 
effective tax rate is similarly defined for companies chartered in states other than the 
state in question.  That is, the foreign tax rate is the sum of total net taxes paid to state 
s by foreign firms divided by the premiums written in state s by foreign firms.  Table 
3 shows the effective domestic and foreign premium tax rates by state for the 
property-casualty industry for 2004; the mean domestic tax rate in 2004 was 2.3 
percent while the average foreign rate was 2.6 percent.   
                                                          
11 This level of detail for state taxes is not available for the life insurance industry. 
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TABLE 3.  STATE NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE PREMIUM TAX RATES FOR PROPERTY/ 
CASUALTY LINES OF COVERAGE, 2004 
Effective Tax Rate2 
State General Tax Rate1 Foreign Domestic
Alabama 3.6%  
 
3.58% 2.13%
Alaska 2.70% 2.71% 3.05%
Arizona 2.00% 2.32% 2.40%
Arkansas 2.50% 3.01% 2.77%
California 2.35% 2.35% 2.54%
Colorado 2.00% 1.80% 1.04%
Connecticut 1.75% 2.33% 2.27%
Delaware 1.75% 2.98% 1.98%
D.C. 1.70% 4.02% 1.61%
Florida 1.75%****** 2.59% 2.43%
Georgia 4.75%**** 4.99% 3.21%
Hawaii 4.265% 3.81% 2.11%
Idaho 2.50% 2.90% 1.42%
Illinois privilege tax of 0.5%/0.4%** 2.17% 1.54%
Indiana 1.30% 1.83% 0.41%
Iowa 1.50% 1.84% 1.82%
Kansas 2.00% 1.95% 1.44%
Kentucky 3.00%**** 3.14% 0.21%
Louisiana 2%*** 3.39% 2.42%
Maine 2.00% 2.86% 2.73%
Maryland 2.00% 2.26% 2.23%
Massachusetts 2.28% 2.70% 2.88%
Michigan taxed under Single Business Tax 1.70% 0.98%
Minnesota 2.00% 2.27% 1.96%
Mississippi 3.00% 3.87% 3.72%
Missouri 2.00% 2.08% 1.76%
Montana 2.75% 2.96% 3.64%
Nebraska 1.00% 1.84% 1.83%
Nevada 3.50% 3.26% 1.82%
New Hampshire 2.00% 2.93% 3.70%
New Jersey 2.10% 2.54% 1.26%
New Mexico 3.03% 3.11% 5.48%
New York 2.00% 2.71% 3.04%
Table 3 continues next page…
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TABLE 3 (CONT).  STATE NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE PREMIUM TAX RATES FOR 
PROPERTY/ CASUALTY LINES OF COVERAGE, 2004 
Effective Tax Rate2 
State General Tax Rate1  Foreign Domestic
North Carolina 1.90% 2.45% 2.58%
North Dakota 1.75% 1.44% 1.60%
Ohio 1.40% 1.75% 1.62%
Oklahoma 2.25% 2.30% 2.24%
Oregon s.t. corporate excise tax on net income 1.62% 2.40%
Pennsylvania 2.00% 2.37% 2.66%
Rhode Island 2.00% 2.48% 3.73%
South Carolina 3.25%**** 4.17% 4.72%
South Dakota 2.50% 2.44% 1.72%
Tennessee 2.50% 2.79% 0.92%
Texas 1.60% 2.02% 1.76%
Utah 2.25% 2.65% 7.28%
Vermont 2.00% 2.59% 2.83%
Virginia 2.25% 2.68% 2.76%
Washington 2.00% 2.12% 2.06%
West Virginia 3.00% 4.03% 0.81%
Wisconsin 2% or income tax***** 1.93% 1.49%
Wyoming 0.75% 1.88% 1.98%
1Source:  Retaliation: A Guide to State Retaliatory Taxes, Fees, Deposits, and Other 
Requirements.  Volume 1, December 2005, National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners. 
Note:  The effective rates include all taxes licenses and fees and thus will differ from the 
nominal tax rate shown in the second column. Many states also subject premiums to an 
additional tax on a portion of premiums for the provision of fire services.  In addition there 
may be additional taxes on marine insurance, workers compensation and for insurance sold 
by non-licensed carriers.  These additional taxes along with the retaliatory tax will often 
raise the effective tax rate.  States also have provisions which provide domestics (and in 
some cases foreign companies) with job credits or credits for investments made within the 
states.  This will tend to reduce the effective rate from the nominal rate.  
*The 2.3% rate applies to Life Insurance companies.  Other lines face a tax rate of 1.6%. 
**The 0.5% rate applies to all lines except Health.  Health lines are subject to a tax rate of 
0.4%.  ***Tax is $140 for premiums less than $7,000 or less.  Add $225 for each additional 
$10,000 or fraction thereof.  **** Includes local premium tax.  *****Applies to certain life 
insurance companies.  ******Florida makes an additional assessment to pay for past 
hurricane losses covered by state cat fund. 
2Author’s calculations. 
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The states have different tax policies for foreign and domestic companies that 
lead to differences in tax rates between domestic and foreign companies.  This is seen 
in the data in Table 3.  The overall US average insurance premium tax rates are 
different between foreign and domestic companies. These differences in tax policy 
toward domestic and foreign companies can be as simple as a rate difference or a 
subtle as differences in credits.  For example, Georgia nominally has the same tax 
rate for foreign and domestic companies, but it provides a lower rate for those 
companies that invest 75 percent of their assets in the state.  Domestic companies are 
more likely to be able to invest 75 percent of their assets within the state to obtain a 
significant reduction in the tax rate than would foreign companies.  This is, in part,  
because in Georgia local companies are relatively small and while there are some 
small foreign companies, most of the large ones would not be permitted (for 
prudential reasons) to invest 75 percent of their assets in any one state.  Table 3 also 
illustrates the possible rationale for using the insurance tax system to attract 
companies to the state.  Companies chartered in relatively high premium tax rate 
states will face a higher premium tax in relatively low tax environments.12   
There is a substantial range of effective domestic tax rates.  For 2004, the 
rates ranged from 0.21 percent to 7.28 percent, with a mean of 2.33 percent and 
median of 2.13 percent.  Nearly half of the states have tax rates within 0.5 percentage 
points of the median.  There is little correlation between the nominal and effective 
domestic  tax  rates;  the  correlation  coefficient  is  0.14.   The  range of the effective  
 
                                                          
12 One other item to note is that the data underlying the effective tax rate includes 
premium taxes, retaliatory taxes, as well as other fees and assessments.  The fees tend to 
be relatively small as they are charges for regulatory reviews and licenses.  Assessments 
can be relatively large and occur when a bankrupt insurer has liabilities greater than its 
assets.  In almost every state, the remaining insurers are assessed an amount based on 
market share to cover any shortfall caused by an insurer’s bankruptcy.  Some portion of 
this assessment each year is often deductible (or creditable) against the premium tax as a 
carry-forward.   In addition, there are some other differences in state taxation that may 
lead to effective rates being greater or less than the nominal rates. 
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foreign tax rates is 1.44 percent to 4.99 percent, with a mean of 2.64 percent and a 
median of 2.54 percent.  The correlation coefficient between the foreign and domestic 
effective rates is 0.296.   
Figure 1 shows the pattern of the U.S. average foreign and domestic effective 
tax  rates  over  the  period  1992-2004.   As can be seen, the effective foreign tax rate 
declined over the period, from 3.2 percent to 2.6 percent.  The U.S. average domestic 
effective tax rate has fluctuated over the period, but there is no discernable trend.  
The effective foreign tax rate is larger than the effective domestic tax rate, but the 
difference has declined over the period. 
 
FIGURE 1.  AVERAGE EFFECTIVE TAX RATE, 1992-2004 
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
Ta
x 
R
at
e
Foreign Tax Rate Domestic Tax Rate
 
 
Tables 4 and 5 compare the distribution by quintile for the 1992 and 2004 
domestic and foreign effective tax rates tax, respectively.  For the domestic tax rate, 
nearly 50 percent of the states were in the same quintile in both periods, while nearly 
an equal percentage where in higher and lower quintiles.   For the effective foreign 
tax rate only 25 percent of the states were in the same quintile in both years, and a 
slightly greater percent of states had a higher tax rate in 2004 than in 1992. 
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TABLE 4.  TRANSITION FROM QUINTILE IN 1992 TO QUINTILE IN 2004,  
EFFECTIVE DOMESTIC TAX RATE 
  -------------------------2004------------------------ 
   0 1 2 3 4 
19
92
 
0 5 1 2 0 1 
1 0 6 2 2 0 
2 4 2 2 2 0 
3 0 1 2 4 3 
4 0 0 2 2 8 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.  TRANSITION FROM QUINTILE IN 1992 TO QUINTILE IN 2004,  
EFFECTIVE FOREIGN TAX RATE 
  -------------------------2004------------------------ 
   0 1 2 3 4 
19
92
 
0 3 0 4 0 2 
1 1 3 0 2 4 
2 2 1 3 2 2 
3 0 1 1 4 4 
4 3 5 2 2 0 
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V. Tax Rates and the Size of the State Insurance Industry 
 
We compare tax rates to the employment in the property-casualty industry 
(excluding agents) in a state in a given year.  These data come from the Bureau of the 
Census; we have a consistently defined series from 1992-2004.  The series for PC 
employment is from the NAICS series 524126.  The average state has 1.5 employees 
per 1,000 population. 
Figure 2 shows how insurance employment per capita varies with the 
effective domestic tax rate.  It is hard to see much of a pattern, and a simple 
regression produces a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient on the tax 
rate.  Of course, this regression does not control for any of the other factors that might 
explain the variation in employment in the insurance industry across states.  There are 
several states that have a low tax rate but low insurance employment per capita (for 
example, Wyoming, West Virginia, Idaho, and North Dakota), while a few have high 
tax and high employment (for example, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 
Massachusetts).  We also ran a regression on the number of property-causality firms 
in a state against the effective domestic tax rate.  Again the coefficient is negative but 
statistically insignificant. 
 
FIGURE 2.  INSURANCE EMPLOYMENT AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATE 
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We ran the same two regressions, but used the effective foreign tax rate.  For 
these two regressions, the coefficients on the tax variable are both negative and 
statistically significant.  However, the coefficients are very small, and imply an 
elasticity of employment per capita with respect to the tax rate that is very close to 
zero.   
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VI. Regression Analysis  
 
 We turn now to a more complex regression analysis.   
 
Regression Model 
We assume that employment in the insurance industry in each state is in 
equilibrium, and that equilibrium employment depends on factors that reflect demand 
and cost.  Our regression model includes the effective domestic and foreign tax rates 
on insurance premiums, a set of variables that reflect the size of the insurance market 
in each state and relevant costs in each state, and state and time fixed effects.  The 
state fixed effects control for state-specific differences in climate, raw materials, 
presence of metropolitan areas, and other factors that can cause output differences 
across states, and the time fixed effects control for time-specific, nationwide factors 
such as the business cycle, population, federal fiscal and monetary policy.  The 
regression model is given by 
Ets = β0 + β1 DtsT  + β2
F
tsT  + ∑ βiXts + vs + µt +εts   [1] 
where Ets is a measure of employment in the insurance industry in state s in year t, TD 
and TF are the effective domestic and foreign insurance premium tax rates, X is a set 
of variables measuring size of the market and cost factors, v is a set of fixed state 
dummies, µ is a set of fixed time dummies, and ε is an error term.   We estimate 
equation 3 using ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and generalized least 
squares regression (GLS) but report only the OLS as the results are substantially 
similar. In addition, we employed lagged variables for the tax rates and found similar 
results. 
 
Data 
Our data consists of a panel for the 50 states for each year 1992 to 2004.  Our 
focus in this paper is on the property-casualty insurance industry, in part, because it is 
possible  to  obtain information about the taxes paid by each insurer writing insurance  
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in a state for this industry.13  Over the time period of the sample there were a number 
(17) of state outliers.  We excluded them if the effective domestic rate was greater 
than the 95 percentile of the distribution of the domestic tax rate.  Most of the 
exclusions we believe are necessary because of specific states tax policies enacted to 
address short-term problems in the state.  For example, Utah currently taxes workers 
compensation premiums at 7.75 percent but in the past it has been as high as 9.75 
percent.  This has an effect of raising the effective rate for the state.  While the 
property and liability insurance industry is relatively homogenous and taxed in a 
similar way, we exclude Utah because of its particular tax policy on workers 
compensation.  To test the robustness of these exclusions we also estimated the 
regressions using a “winsorized” effective tax rate.   A winsor transformation is one 
which replaces distribution outliers with the value of the distribution at a given 
percentile. Thus, if the tax rate was less than the 5th percentile of the distribution of 
tax rates, the tax rate is set to the value of the 5th percentile.  In addition, if the 
effective tax rate was greater than or equal to the 95th percentile, we set the tax rate at 
the value of the 95th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers.14  The results of the 
winsorized regressions are essentially the same as the results of the regression where 
we eliminated state outliers.   
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for our variables for the year 2004.  
We have three main dependent variables.  They are the employment in the property-
casualty industry (excluding agents) in a state in a given year, the number of 
insurance agents employed in a state in a given year, and the share of national 
property-casualty employment in a given state in a given year.  These data come from 
the Bureau of the Census; we have a consistently defined series from 1992-2004.  
The series for property-casualty employment is from the NAICS series 524126 and 
the  insurance agents are from NAICS series 5242.  One important item to note is that  
 
                                                          
13 This level of detail for state taxes is not available for the life insurance industry as the State 
Page reports, while similar, do not contain state specific information concerning taxes paid. 
14 See Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2005) for an application of winsorized data. 
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TABLE 6.  SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 2004 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Employment in Property Casualty Industry Per Capita 
Agent Per Capita 
Domestic Rate 
Foreign Rate 
Sales Tax Receipts per $ Million Personal Income 
Domestic PC Market Share 
Number of Domestic PC Companies 
Number of Foreign PC Companies 
Education Exp Per Million in Population 
Health Exp Per Million in Population 
Transportation Exp Per Million in Population 
Welfare Exp per Million in Population 
Average Agent Wage Per Capita 
Property Tax Receipts Per Million in Population 
Premiums Per 1000 Population 
Share of National PC Employment in State 
1.521 
2.904 
0.023 
0.026 
0.037 
0.191 
40.940 
600.060 
2.228 
0.500 
0.544 
1.156 
0.048 
1.025 
23.666 
0.020 
0.882 
0.577 
0.012 
0.007 
0.012 
0.123 
42.715 
94.333 
0.341 
0.221 
0.242 
0.334 
0.010 
0.417 
4.546 
0.023 
0.000 
1.774 
0.002 
0.014 
0.009 
0.019 
1.000 
384.000 
1.656 
0.137 
0.332 
0.627 
0.031 
0.367 
17.437 
0.000 
4.060 
4.197 
0.073 
0.050 
0.063 
0.500 
178.000
776.000
3.494 
1.384 
1.860 
2.140 
0.074 
2.099 
43.693 
0.093 
N = 50.     
 
agents may sell property-casualty and/or life and health products.  Thus, while the 
other data is solely from the property-casualty industry, the agent data has all 
insurance agents included in the category.  Our priors are that the number of agents in 
a state is driven by the size of the insurance market in the state and not by the 
premium tax rate. 
Our control variables include several that reflect aspects of the property-
casualty industry, including: the number of domestic property-casualty firms in the 
state; the number of foreign property-casualty firms that write policies in the state; 
the share of the market held by domestic firms; the domestic market share of 
multistate property-casualty firms, and; the market share of the largest firm.   
In 2004, the average state had 1.5 employees in the property-casualty industry 
per 1,000 population and about 2 percent of the national property-casualty 
employment.   Property-casualty  premiums  on a per capita basis were approximately  
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$2,400 while the average domestic property-casualty market share was just under 20 
percent. The average state in 2004 had about 40 domestic companies and an 
additional 597 foreign companies operating in the state. 
To control for the stringency of the state’s regulatory environment we employ 
an indicator variable for whether the state regulates price changes with “prior 
approval” or allows companies to set prices subject to an ex post oversight of rates.  
Prior approval states require that the insurer submit its rates for approval from the 
regulator prior to their use in policy contracts.  This prior approval indicator variable 
comes from Harrington (2002) and is a crude but commonly employed variable to 
describe the state’s regulatory environment.  We have no a prior hypothesis regarding 
the direction of the effect of regulation on employment.  It could be that strict 
regulation reduces the output of insurers and this reduces the demand for labor.  Or, it 
could be that strict regulation increases employment in order to better comply with 
the state’s regulations. 
To reflect cost differences across states we use the state average wage for 
insurance agents, obtained from BLS Wages and Salaries series on wages by area and 
occupation.  We use this variable instead of wages from property-casualty insurance 
industry since some states have no domestic companies and thus no reported average 
wage for the industry. 
Finally, we include a set of fiscal variables obtained from the Bureau of the 
Census, including state public expenditure on selected services and measures of 
property tax and sales tax burdens.  We include education expenses per one million 
population, transportation expenditures per one million population, welfare 
expenditures per one million population, and medical expenditure per one million 
population.  We also include as control variables sales taxes per million dollars of 
personal income and property taxes per million population.  
 
Results 
 Table 7 shows the results of the standard fixed effects OLS regression 
described  in  equation  [1];  we  included  both  state and year fixed effects but do not  
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TABLE 7. TWO WAY FIXED EFFECT  REGRESSION FOR EMPLOYMENT PER  
CAPITA IN THE PC INDUSTRY (T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Variable Coefficient Elasticities 
Intercept 3.141 
(8.000)  
Domestic Tax Rate -3.504 
(-2.190) 
-0.046 
Foreign Tax Rate -5.363 
(-1.950) 
-0.092 
Number of Domestic PC Companies 0.001 
(0.850) 
0.038 
Number of Foreign PC Companies -0.002 
(-2.420) 
-0.554 
Domestic PC Market Share 0.259 
(0.830) 
0.034 
Market Share of Largest Company within State -0.405 
(-1.990) 
-0.028 
Domestic Market Share of Multistate Companies -0.091 
(-1.630) 
0.018 
Regulation Indicator -0.100 
(-1.710) 
-0.033 
Average Agent Wage  -10.345 
(-2.450) 
-0.244 
Property Tax Receipts Per Million in Population 0.083 
(1.030) 
0.035 
Sales Tax Receipts per $ Million Personal Income 4.611 
(1.510) 
0.105 
Health Exp Per Million in Population -0.101 
(-0.810) 
-0.023 
Education Exp Per Million in Population -0.100 
(-1.090) 
-0.100 
Transportation Exp Per Million in Population -0.423 
(-2.850) 
-0.109 
Welfare Exp per Million in Population -0.269 
(-3.120) 
-0.136 
N = 604. 
R-sq: within =0.119; between =0.0051; overall =0.0071. 
State and year fixed effects included but not shown. 
Elasticities estimated at the mean. 
State and year fixed effects included but not shown.  
Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at ρ < 10 percent. 
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report their coefficients.  In Table 7 the dependent variable is the per capita 
employment in the property-casualty industry within the state.  (Agents are not 
included in these employment figures and are treated separately below.)  The 
coefficients  on  both the domestic and foreign tax rates are negative, as hypothesized 
and statistically significant.  The elasticity of employment per capita with respect to 
the domestic tax rate, evaluated at the means, is -0.046, while the elasticity with 
respect to the foreign tax rate is larger and equal to -0.096.  These elasticities are 
much smaller than the range reported by Bartik (1992) and Phillips and Goss (1995).   
These results are insensitive to the choice of control variables.   
 We expect that employment should be more responsive to the foreign tax rate 
than the domestic tax rate.  Consider a firm domiciled in a state with domestic tax 
rate tD and a higher foreign tax rate tF.   The firm will pay tD on premiums written in 
the state.  To the extent that a higher tD makes marginal insurance policies 
unprofitable or raises prices and thus reduces the number of policies sold, we should 
expect a reduction in the premiums the firm writes in the state.  This in turn should 
reduce the firm’s employment within the state.  A higher tF will make marginal 
insurance policies that the firm writes in other states unprofitable, which should lead 
to a reduction in employment within the state in which the firm is domiciled.  
Because the domestic share of premiums is small (on average it is about 18.8 percent 
(Table 6)), we would expect a larger employment response to an increase in tF than to 
an increase in tD.  But furthermore, the higher tF also provides an incentive for the 
firm to relocate to another state.  Thus, we would expect the total reduction in 
employment from an increase in tF to be larger than the effect of an increase in tD.  
Our empirical results are consistent with this expectation, i.e., the coefficient on the 
foreign tax rate is a substantially greater (in absolute value) than the coefficient on the 
domestic tax rate although the difference is not statistically significant.  By using the 
elasticities we can calculate a 10 percent increase in the domestic rate for the average 
state would yield a loss of 39 jobs. A similar change in the foreign rate would yield a 
loss of 78 jobs for the average state. 
 
The Effect of Insurance Premium Taxes 
On Employment 
 
25 
 
To account for the fact that the states’ two tax rates are correlated (ρ =0.16), 
we also ran the regression in Table 7 dropping the domestic tax rate from the 
estimation.  The coefficient on the foreign tax rate for that regression is somewhat 
larger (-6.361) and is still statistically significant.   
We included several variables to control for the composition of the property-
casualty insurance industry, only two of which are statistically significant.  The 
number of domestic property-casualty firms in the state is positively related to 
employment per capita, but the coefficient has a very large standard error.  This result 
is consistent with the positive sign on the coefficient for the share of the market 
(premiums written) held by domestic firms.  But again, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient on the number of foreign property-casualty 
firms which write policies in the state is negative and statistically significant.  If there 
is a large number of foreign firms this implies that much of the foreign firms’ 
employment is in other states. Thus, the greater the number of foreign firms the less 
the domestic demand for insurance labor. Finally, the negative coefficients on the 
domestic market share of multistate property-casualty firms and the market share of 
the largest firm are consistent with larger firms having fewer employees relative to 
premiums written.15  
We see that the average agent wage is negatively associated with per capita 
employment.  This is to be expected as the higher labor costs would reduce the 
quantity of labor demanded, all other things equal.  In addition, we see that a strict 
regulator environment is associated with lower employment within the state. 
Finally, we also included several state-level fiscal variables.  Generally these 
variables did not perform as expected, based on the findings in other studies.  The 
coefficients  on  the  property  and  sales  tax  variables  are  both  positive,   which  is 
                                                          
15 We also estimated regressions in which various combinations of these industry variables were 
excluded.  We found that when the three market share variables (multi state market share, market 
share of the largest company within the state, and the domestic market share) were included in the 
regression all three were significant (or nearly so), but when one or two were left out the standard 
errors increased.  It appears that these three measures of market share together measure the 
intricacies of the state market better than any single measure. 
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contrary to expectation, but not significant. We expected the coefficient on the 
education and transportation expenditure variables to be positive, but both are 
negative.  Only the negative coefficients on the health and welfare expenditure 
variables have the expected negative sign, but only the later is statistically significant.  
One possibility for these results is that the insurance industry may not be as 
responsive to general fiscal conditions in the state as are other industries. This makes 
some sense as home owners insurance, workers compensation insurance, and 
automobile insurance likely have inelastic demands as they are either required by law 
(auto and workers compensation) or by mortgage lenders (home owners).  Further, in 
2006 these three lines accounted for over 63 percent of national property-liability 
premiums.16 
A second measure of employment that we use is the number of insurance 
agents per capita.  The results for this regression are found in Table 8.  Recall that 
agents are the sales force for insurers and can be directly employed by an insurer to 
act as an agent within a state, operate as employees of a “franchise”, or operate as 
agents of independent contractors.  Further, they can sell any type of insurance for 
which they have a license, including property-casualty and life insurance products. 
Our results suggest that there is no significant tax effect (either foreign or domestic) 
on the number of agents per capita within the state.  This result is not unexpected 
given the function of agents.  The coefficient on the average agent wage is 
statistically significant and negative, as expected, but has a very small elasticity of 
approximately -0.003.   
Table 9 shows the results for the regression where the dependent variable is 
the state’s percentage share of the U.S. property-casualty employees.  If we were 
using cross-sectional data, dividing state employment by total U.S. property-casualty 
employment would not change the regression results other than the scale of the 
parameters.   With  panel  data,  we  should  expect  a  similar  outcome.   One  would  
                                                          
16 Insurance Information Institute (2008). 
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TABLE 8.  TWO WAY FIXED EFFECT REGRESSION FOR AGENT EMPLOYMENT  
PER CAPITA IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY (T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Variable Coefficient Elasticities 
Intercept 2.688 
(8.970)  
Domestic Tax Rate -0.309 
(-0.310) 
-0.04 
Foreign Tax Rate 2.006 
(1.190) 
0.021 
Number of Domestic PC Companies 0.001 
(1.060) 
0.069 
Number of Foreign PC Companies -0.0003 
(-0.520) 
0.002 
Domestic PC Market Share 0.273 
(1.170) 
-0.099 
Market Share of Largest Company within State -0.553 
-(3.560) 
0.021 
Domestic Market Share of Multistate Companies -0.018 
(-0.420) 
0.021 
Regulation Indicator -0.021 
(-0.470) 
-0.054 
Average Agent Wage  -8.482 
(-2.630) 
-0.003 
Property Tax Receipts Per Million in Population 0.107 
(1.750) 
-0.016 
Sales Tax Receipts per $ Million Personal Income 0.005 
(2.180) 
0.081 
Health Exp Per Million in Population -0.119 
(-1.250) 
-0.023 
Education Exp Per Million in Population -0.166 
(-2.350) 
0.027 
Transportation Exp Per Million in Population 0.529 
(4.930) 
-0.037 
Welfare Exp per Million in Population -0.126 
(-1.900) 
-0.118 
N = 604. 
R-sq: within =0.4621; between =0.0311; overall =0.0329. 
State and year fixed effects included but not shown. 
Elasticities estimated at the mean. 
Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at ρ < 10 percent. 
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TABLE 9.  TWO WAY FIXED EFFECT REGRESSION FOR STATE’S  
SHARE OF NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE PC INDUSTRY  
(T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Variable   Coefficient Elasticity 
Intercept 0.061  
  (9.400)   
Domestic Rate -0.024 -0.024 
  -(0.920)   
Foreign Rate -0.078 -0.102 
  -(1.730)   
Number of Domestic PC Companies 0.000 0.008 
  (0.130)   
Number of Foreign PC Companies -0.00006 -1.690 
  -(5.910)   
Domestic PC Market Share 0.015 0.147 
  (2.840)   
Market Share of Largest Company within State -0.004 -0.020 
  -(1.110)   
Domestic Market Share of Multistate Companies -0.002 0.029 
  -(2.140)   
Regulation Indicator -0.001 -0.028 
  -(1.140)   
Average Agent Wage Per Capita -0.069 -0.123 
  -(0.990)   
Property Tax Receipts Per Million in Population 0.001 0.044 
  (1.040)   
Sales Tax Receipts per $ Million Personal Income 0.016 0.027 
  (0.310)   
Health Exp Per Million in Population -0.002 -0.035 
  -(0.990)   
Education Exp Per Million in Population -0.002 -0.153 
  -(1.320)   
Transportation Exp Per Million in Population -0.004 -0.083 
  -(1.730)   
Welfare Exp per Million in Population -0.003 -0.118 
  -(2.170)   
N = 604. 
R-sq: within =0.1377; between =0.0437; overall = 0.034. 
Elasticities estimated at the mean. 
Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at ρ = 0.1 level. 
State and year fixed effects included but not shown. 
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hypothesize that lower taxes might cause the distribution of the property-casualty 
industry employees in the U.S. to shift to those states with lower tax rates, all other 
things held constant.  The coefficients on both of the two tax policy variables, the 
domestic and foreign tax rates, are negative, but only the coefficient on the foreign 
tax rate is statistically significant, and that at the 7 percent level with a two-tail test.  
One interesting negative result is that states had historically believed that they could 
keep foreign companies out by having a high tax rate.  This was the real rational in 
setting a discriminatory tax on foreign insurers.  Our results in Table 9 suggest that 
there is a negative relationship between the share of employment in a state and the  
foreign tax rate.  The result suggests these discriminatory policies could reduce the 
share of employment in the industry in the discriminatory state.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court in Metropolitan v. Ward invalidated these overt discriminatory taxes in 1985 
just prior to the beginning of our data.  Thus, the effects of overt discrimination are 
no longer significant at standard levels, but there is some weak evidence that the 
discriminatory policy reduced the share of employment in a state.  Most of the 
coefficients on the other variables have the same signs and are significant as in Table 
7.   
Table 10 shows the results of the fixed effects regression where we employ 
per capita premiums as the dependant variable.  Obviously this is not an employment 
variable, but it is included to provide some additional evidence on how taxes affect 
the state market for property-casualty insurance.  We would expect that higher 
domestic or foreign tax rates will reduce the volume of premiums written in the state, 
and the empirical results for the foreign rate are consistent with this expectation. 
However, for the domestic rate we see that there is a positive relationship between the 
rate and the premiums per 1,000 in population. We examined a number of different 
specifications (including various interaction and quadratic terms) and the results seem 
robust.  As a final robustness test we examined the difference between the foreign 
and domestic rates.  This is shown in Model 2 of Table 10.  Because for some states 
in our sample the domestic rate is greater than the foreign rate, we divide the 
difference  variable  into  a  positive  difference  variable  for  those  states  where  the  
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TABLE 10. TWO WAY FIXED EFFECT REGRESSION FOR PREMIUMS PER 1000 POPULATION  
(T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
---------Model 1--------- ----------Model 2-------- 
  Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity 
Intercept 
  
13.768 
(5.580) 
12.674 
(5.220) 
Domestic Rate 
  
21.380 
(2.130) 
0.024 
  
Foreign Rate 
  
-49.646 
-(2.880) 
-0.074 
 
Positive Difference Between Foreign and Domestic Rates 
 
-47.149 
-(4.010) 
-0.002 
  
Negative Difference Between Foreign and Domestic Rates 
 
37.163 
(1.460) 
-0.019 
  
Number of Domestic PC Companies 
  
0.025 
(2.500) 
0.061 
  
0.024 
(2.340) 
0.061 
  
Number of Foreign PC Companies 
  
-0.004 
-(0.960) 
-0.119 
  
-0.003 
-(0.670) 
-0.119 
  
Domestic PC Market Share 
  
-1.901 
-(0.970) 
-0.022 
  
-1.209 
-(0.610) 
-0.022 
  
Market Share of Largest Company within State 
  
1.106 
(0.870) 
0.007 
  
1.108 
(0.870) 
0.007 
  
Domestic Market Share of Multistate Companies 
  
-0.376 
-(1.070) 
0.006 
  
-0.450 
-(1.280) 
0.006 
  
Regulation Indicator 
  
0.081 
(0.220) 
0.002 
  
0.093 
(0.250) 
0.002 
  
Average Agent Wage Per Capita 
  
31.099 
(1.170) 
0.063 
  
25.789 
(0.980) 
0.063 
  
Property Tax Receipts Per Million in Population 
  
0.352 
(0.700) 
0.013 
  
0.316 
(0.630) 
0.013 
  
Sales Tax Receipts per $ Million Personal Income 
  
4.947 
(0.260) 
0.010 
  
6.308 
(0.330) 
0.010 
  
Health Exp Per Million in Population 
  
0.548 
(0.700) 
0.011 
  
0.517 
(0.670) 
0.011 
  
Education Exp Per Million in Population 
  
-0.539 
-(0.930) 
-0.047 
  
-0.579 
-(1.010) 
-0.047 
  
Transportation Exp Per Million in Population 
  
4.821 
(5.190) 
0.107 
  
4.878 
(5.280) 
0.107 
  
Welfare Exp per Million in Population 
  
1.387 
(2.560) 
0.060 
  
1.354 
(2.520) 
0.060 
  
N = 604. 
R-sq. 0.8658 0.8671 
Elasticities estimated at the mean. 
Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at ρ = 0.1 level. 
The Effect of Insurance Premium Taxes 
On Employment 
 
31 
 
difference is positive and a negative difference variable for those states where the 
difference is negative.   The coefficient on the positive difference variable is negative, 
significant, and close in value to that of the foreign rate in Model 1, indicating that an 
increase in the difference reduces the aggregate value of premiums in a state.  Thus, 
for premiums per capita it is the effect of the difference in rates that seems to matter 
rather than the absolute level of the rates.  While the coefficient on the positive 
difference variable is of similar magnitude to the coefficient on the foreign rate in 
Model 1, its elasticity is very small, indicating that although the difference in the 
rates matter, the effect of that difference on premiums in a state is small.  The 
coefficient on the negative difference variable was positive but not significant.  
 
The Effect of Insurance Premium 
Taxes on Employment 
 
32 
 
 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
This report examined the effect of state taxation on employment in the 
property-casualty industry, a well defined industry with significant firm specific tax 
and operational information provided by insurance regulators.  Together with state 
data on employment for direct employees of the insurance companies as well as 
complementary information for insurance agents, we were able to examine the effect 
of state tax policy on employment.  We were further able to break down the tax paid 
by domestic and foreign companies operating within a state.  While the tax base is 
similar for the states (gross premiums written) and the statutory rates are in a similar 
range, there are differences in effective tax rates across states.   
We find that state tax policy has a significant effect on employment.  We 
found evidence that a 10 percent increase in the domestic rate would cause a loss of 
about 39 jobs while a similar increase in the effective foreign rate would cause a loss 
of 78 jobs.  For Georgia, the results imply that a one percentage point reduction in the 
domestic premium tax rate would generate 334 new jobs, while an equal reduction in 
the foreign premium tax rate would generate 525 new jobs.  
The size of the employment changes appears relatively small.  We undertook 
a number of robustness checks to see if the results changed.  We employed other 
specifications of the domestic and foreign rates (i.e. the difference between the two 
rather than each separately).  We also examined different specifications for the long-
run dynamic panel and were not able to obtain different results.   
Compared to studies of other industries, our estimates are small.  It could be 
that the property-casualty insurance industry is simply less responsive to taxes than 
other industries.  Since we have a well-defined industry and are able to measure the 
effective tax rate with high precision, our results could better reflect the effect of 
taxes on state employment than other studies. 
One possible reason for the relatively small employment effect is that the 
demand  for personal insurance is relatively inelastic.  People are required to purchase 
homeowners insurance by their mortgage lenders.  In addition, a minimum amount of 
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automobile insurance is required by each state.  By themselves, the homeowners and 
personal automobile market account for approximately 54 percent of the premiums 
written nationwide.  Thus, if the demand for the insurance is inelastic, the effect on 
firm’s labor decision is likely to be small as the policy owners bear the major 
incidence of the tax.  However, firms still have profit incentives to operate in lower 
tax environments due to the operation of the retaliatory tax. 
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